The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Mor Sobol – associate professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University, Taiwan and contributing author to “Israel-Asia Relations in the Twenty-First Century: The Search for Partners in a Changing World” (2024) – is the 442nd in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
What changes can be expected in U.S.-EU cooperation on China and Taiwan under a Trump 2.0 presidency?
Under a Trump 2.0 presidency, U.S.-EU cooperation would likely become more fragmented. Trump’s “America First” policies, transactional approach to alliances, and focus on short-term economic gains might strain alignment on both Taiwan and China-related issues.
For the EU, managing these dynamics presents a dual challenge. Internally, the bloc has significant divisions concerning European policies towards the U.S., China, and Taiwan, complicating its ability to present a unified stance. Externally, Washington is expected to pressure Europe to support its agenda in areas such as trade, technology transfer, and infrastructure security. While not directly tied to Taiwan, these areas are critical for aligning transatlantic strategies. Still, one might assume that Europe’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine would limit its capacity to engage deeply in Taiwan-related security issues.
Ultimately, as tensions between the U.S. and China and across the Taiwan Strait rise, Europe may need to walk an extremely fine line between preserving beneficial trade relationships with both Beijing and Washington while aligning selectively on policy areas, such as supporting the U.S. on economy and security issues while collaborating with China on climate-related initiatives and environmental policies.
With the EU facing tariffs from China and potentially the U.S., how might Brussels manage relations with Washington?
Indeed, engaging in trade wars with Washington and Beijing presents a highly problematic scenario for Europe. Trump’s proposed tariffs, including a universal 10 percent tariff on imports and a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods, could severely disrupt transatlantic trade. For example, Germany and its automotive sector would surely be negatively affected.
As such, the EU would likely adopt a dual strategy of engagement and internal fortification. On the one hand, Brussels has been preparing measures to protect European industries and deter aggression, such as adopting the “Anti-Coercion Instrument” to address economic pressures. On the other, Europe might seek to ease tensions with Trump by offering attractive deals, such as increased purchases of American liquefied natural gas, agricultural products, or military equipment.
While Beijing may attempt to improve relations with Brussels and key European member states in order to persuade the EU to align against an increasingly protectionist and isolationist U.S., at the end of the day, Europe views China as both a competitor and a systemic rival, and the U.S. as a like-minded ally and, more importantly, a crucial player in European security. When push comes to shove, Europe will tilt toward the U.S. if it is forced to choose.
How might Taiwan-U.S. relations change under the new Trump administration?
Essentially, it is important to remember that U.S.-Taiwan relations during Trump’s first term were actually rather strong. Prominent examples include high-profile visits by American officials such as Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar and Under Secretary of State Keith Krach, the Taiwan Travel Act, and increased arms sales. That said, Trump’s rhetoric accusing Taiwan of “stealing” U.S. semiconductor jobs and suggesting Taiwan should “pay for defense” signals a potential shift to a more transactional approach. Thus, under a new Trump administration, Taiwan may face direct questions like, “Why should we protect you?” or “What can you bring to the table?”
This shift could strain Taiwan’s strategic positioning, as Trump prioritizes economic benefits over democracy and human rights. Although arms sales and military cooperation may continue, Taiwan could find itself in a precarious situation, especially if it becomes a bargaining chip in future U.S.-China negotiations. In this context, it will be particularly interesting to observe how Trump’s Cabinet picks will influence U.S. policy, as there is a distinct divide between China hawks like Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser-designate Mike Waltz and the new efficiency tsar Elon Musk, who has expressed a more favorable view of China.
How might the incoming U.S. administration’s pressure on Taipei to increase Taiwan’s defense spending impact EU-Taiwan relations?
Based on previous comments from Trump and senior figures in his new administration, we should expect increased American pressure on Taiwan to raise its defense spending, potentially from 2.5 percent to 5 percent or even 10 percent of GDP. Trump’s transactional stance, particularly his assertion that Taiwan should pay “protection money,” might suggest American expectations that much of this spending should benefit the U.S. military-industrial complex.
While this may align with EU support for Taiwan’s self-defense and democratic stability in the Indo-Pacific, the EU’s primary focus remains on economic and technological ties, as well as adherence to the One China policy. Europe is also heavily preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, which reshapes its strategic priorities and limits bandwidth for security engagement with Taiwan. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s increased defense spending could divert resources from industries central to EU-Taiwan collaboration, such as semiconductors and green tech, potentially weakening economic ties over time.
Assess how Beijing and Moscow could benefit from erosion in U.S.-EU cooperation on managing Taiwan Strait tensions.
Obviously, a broken transatlantic relationship could offer significant strategic advantages for President Putin and President Xi. For Beijing, diminished transatlantic unity could reduce international pressure on its policies toward Taiwan, allowing China greater latitude to exert influence through military, economic, or diplomatic means. The absence of a coordinated U.S.-EU response might embolden Beijing to escalate coercive actions without facing unified economic or military countermeasures.
Moscow could also exploit this divide by solidifying its partnership with Beijing, leveraging shared opposition to Western influence. A weakened transatlantic alliance might reduce NATO’s capacity to address simultaneous crises in Europe and Asia, allowing Russia to advance its interests in Ukraine or other strategic regions with less resistance. Finally, both powers could use the discord to amplify narratives of Western decline, undermining the credibility of U.S. and EU leadership globally.
